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Abstract
Error correction will add so much overhead to large quantum compu-
tations that we suspect the most efficient algorithms will use a classical
co-processor to do as much work as possible. We present a method to
offload portions of a quantum computation to a classical computer by
producing a superposition of masks which hide a quantum input. With
the masks, we can measure the result without altering the original input
and then perform classical computations on the measured output. If the
task has enough structure, the classical computations will be equivalent to
a quantum computation performed in superposition. We apply this tech-
nique to modular inversion, root-finding, division with remainder, sparse
matrix inversion, and inverting generic group homomorphisms, achieving
at least a constant-factor improvement in quantum operations for each.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to uncompute or invert this technique because
of the measurement, and thus we know of no useful algorithm which ben-
efits from superposition masking.
1 Introduction
Quantum algorithms have asymptotic advantanges over classical algorithms on
certain problems [12, 21]. However, these asymptotic results ignore constant
factors and quantum computers are expected to have non-negligible constant
factor penalties relative to classical computers due to the overhead of error
correction [7, 9, 11, 22]. In fact, the expected constant factor difference is large
enough that it is worth spending some time emphasizing.
Classically, performing a logic gate is too cheap to count. A single CPU, with
its billions of transistors and clock speeds in the gigahertz, performs quintillions
of logic gates per second. Quantumly, individual logic gates are too expensive to
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ignore. For example, suppose we have a large scale quantum computer based on
applying the surface code to superconducting qubits (with a physical gate error
rate around one in a thousand, a surface code cycle time around a microsecond,
and a desired logical gate error rate below one in a billion). In this context, a
single quantum CNOT gate would involve thousands of physical qubits and take
tens of microseconds [14]. Real time error correction of the physical measure-
ments performed as part of the CNOT could saturate multiple CPUs [8, 23].
This suggests that the constant factor of running a gate quantumly, instead of
classically, is at least one billion (in terms of area time).
The huge constant factor penalty of quantum computation over classical
computation creates an interesting dynamic in the design of efficient quantum
computations. Anything that can be offloaded to a classical computer is effec-
tively free. As an example, a classical computer can compute a table of data
and the quantum computer can do lookups in the table to accelerate operations
such as big integer multiplication [10, 24]. These techniques led to the cheapest
methods for Shor’s algorithm [11, 15].
Another interesting dynamic which emerges from the design of efficient quan-
tum computations is an asymmetry between computation and uncomputation.
For example, computing the AND of two qubits requires non-stabilizer opera-
tions such as T gates or Toffoli gates but the AND can be uncomputed using
only stabilizer operations [16]. In the surface code, non-stabilizer operations re-
quires costly operations such as magic state distillation [3, 4, 7], and as a result
the area time of an AND gate computation is an order of magnitude or two
larger than for its uncomputation. The asymmetry in the cost ultimately comes
from the irreversibility of measurement. The uncomputation of the AND gate
uses measurement in a crucial way, but because measurement has no inverse
this trick can’t be inverted for use during the initial computation of the AND
gate.
Interestingly, in all prior examples of compute/uncompute cost asymmetry
that we are aware of [2, 10, 16], it is the uncomputation that benefits from the
ability to perform measurement. Our results in this paper are the first example
we know of where the ability to measure favors the computation.
Section 2 gives an overview of the technique, which we call superposition
masking. Instead of a rigorous generalization, we give several example appli-
cations. We show both constant and non-constant improvements in quantum
costs, at the expense of more classical computation. Given the large constant
factor difference between quantum and classical computation, we expect that
our method improves the real cost of these computations.
In Section 3 we discuss limitations and complexity. While some of our exam-
ples provide asymptotic improvements in quantum gate cost, to the best of our
knowledge, none of these techniques help with a specific quantum algorithm.
Our hope is that the examples convey the sense of the idea, and that there will
be some application in the future that can use this technique.
2
2 Superposition Masking
2.1 Overview
Most quantum algorithms involve some fully-quantum step such as a controlled
phase shift or a quantum Fourier transform, punctuated by a quantum imple-
mentation of a classical task. The fully-quantum steps are often a negligible
fraction of the entire cost. Thus, we would like to perform as much of the
classical task as possible on a classical co-processor.
For the classical processor to process the quantum data, it would need to
measure it, which would destroy the state. To preserve the data through mea-
surement, we introduce superposition masking. In each application, we follow
the same steps:
1. Create a superposition of masks in a new register.
2. Combine the masks with the input in some way and measure the result.
3. Perform an expensive classical computation on the measurement result.
4. Write the output of this computation into a quantum register, and clean
up the mask.
For this to work properly, we need to ensure that when we combine the
masks with the input, the result is completely independent of the input, so that
the state is preserved when we measure. Then the measurement just entangles
the masks with the inputs.
The classical computation can only operate on one input, so we can only use
this method for functions that are sufficiently homomorphic.
2.2 Modular inverses
Given a classically known prime p of n bits and an arbitrary superposition of
states |a〉 with a ∈ {1, . . . , p − 1}. Throughout this section, all arithmetic will
be implicitly performed modulo p.
First we construct the mask, which is a superposition of integers between 1
and p− 1:
1√
p− 1 |a〉
p−1∑
r=1
|r〉 . (1)
We then multiply the first and second registers into a third, which masks
the value of a:
1√
p− 1 |a〉
p−1∑
r=1
|r〉 |ar〉 . (2)
We then measure the third register. Because p is prime, the result will be
uniformly random among {1, . . . , p − 1} and thus reveal no information about
a. Let t = ar. We can then rewrite r = a−1t and our resulting state is
|a〉 |r〉 = |a〉 ∣∣a−1t〉.
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We then classically invert t with the extended Euclidean algorithm. Then
we can multiply this value with the second register, to obtain
|a〉
∣∣a−1t〉 ∣∣a−1〉 (3)
and finally we multiply the third register by t to clear the second register.
Costs Multiplying by the mask is the most expensive step, since we are mul-
tiplying two quantum integers. The best practical circuits for this are O(n2),
which is the same asymptotic cost as the extended Euclidean algorithm [18, 20].
The remaining two multiplications are with classical integers, so with win-
dowing the cost is O(n2/ lgn) [10].
Overall, we save a constant factor over the extended Euclidean algorithm.
This factor could be between 7 and 42, depending on the underlying addition
circuits and the cost metric we use [15].
Composite moduli and non-coprime inputs If a = 0 then it has no well-
defined inverse. It may be that if we are careful about how we prepare the input
to the modular inversion, then it will not have |0〉 in superposition. However,
this may not always be true and we may still wish to “invert” an input of 0 to
some specific value (for example, 0).
For this case, we will instead use a control qubit to just copy the mask r to
the third register if a = 0. Once we have measured the result and inverted it,
we also use the check qubit to control the uncomputation of r. This allows us
to output any value we wish for “0−1”, such as 0.
To do the same for thing for non-coprime inputs would require a circuit
to detect such inputs; however, this seems to require computing the greatest
common divisor, which is as expensive as modular inversion.
If we know the factorization of our modulus, we can construct a superposition
of masking integers r that are co-prime to the modulus. When we multiply
by our input and measure, then if the result is still co-prime to the modulus,
then we have destroyed any states in the superposition that were not coprime
to the modulus. Conversely, a non-trivial divisor of the measurement result
would imply that we had destroyed any states that were coprime. Which one is
preferable will depend on the application.
Uncomputation Unlike methods based on the extended Euclidean algorithm,
this cannot be made into an in-place algorithm. This is because the measure-
ment means we cannot invert the process. From the final state of |a〉
∣∣a−1〉,
we would want to multiply a and a−1 to clear a, but this is unhelpful without
in-place multiplication: a circuit that maps |a〉 |b〉 to |a〉 |ab〉. Existing multipli-
cation circuits are out-of-place [15, 19, 20], and a cheap in-place multiplication
circuit could simply be inverted to give a cheap division algorithm, making the
superposition masking technique unnecessary.
Conversely, a circuit for in-place inversion gives in-place multiplication. Start-
ing from an out-of-place multiplication of a and b, which produces registers of
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a, b, and ab, we would like to clear the register containing b. To do this we
would invert a, then multiply a−1 by ab to clear b. Then the same inversion
circuit can clear a−1. Since we cannot clear a−1 with our measurement-based
technique, the best operation we can create is
|a〉 |b〉 7→ |a〉 ∣∣a−1〉 |ab〉 . (4)
However, this may be sufficient for certain purposes.
2.3 Modular Square Roots
Given an n-bit prime p, we again start with a superposition of states |a〉, where
all a are assumed to be quadratic residues. We want to compute one of the two
integers b such that b2 ≡ a mod p.
We produce the same uniform superposition of masks as for modular inver-
sion. This time, we first square the mask and then multiply with the input, to
give
|a〉 1√
p− 1
p−1∑
r=1
|r〉 ∣∣r2〉 ∣∣ar2〉 . (5)
We then measure ar2. If a is a quadratic residue modulo p, then we can find
t := ±a1/2r from the measurement result. We then uncompute the ∣∣r2〉 register.
The resulting state 6 is still a superposition of r, since we could have either r
or −r:
|a〉 1√
2
(|r〉+ |−r〉) = |a〉 1√
2
(∣∣∣a−1/2t
〉
+
∣∣∣−a−1/2t
〉)
. (6)
Multiplying the second register by t−1 produces
1√
2
|a〉
(∣∣∣a−1/2
〉
+
∣∣∣−a−1/2
〉)
(7)
Depending on the application, we may not want a superposition of the two
possible roots. We can remove one of them by comparing each to p−1
2
and
flipping an ancilla qubit if the state is strictly greater than p−1
2
. We then use
this ancilla to control a modular negation. If we define a−1/2 to be the root
with value at most p−1
2
, this process will have the effect of
1√
2
(∣∣∣a−1/2
〉
+
∣∣∣−a−1/2
〉)
7→
∣∣∣a−1/2
〉 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) . (8)
The second register is just a |+〉 state and can be removed. We are then left
with
|a〉
∣∣∣a−1/2
〉
. (9)
To find a1/2, we need to compute a modular inversion. We use the extended
Euclidean algorithm. We then square the result to clear the input |a〉, leaving
us with only
∣∣a1/2〉.
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Cost This costs 2 modular squares, 2 classical-quantum modular multipli-
cations, one modular inversion, and one comparison. Overall, this costs O(n2)
quantum gates. This is better than the O(n3) gates needed to naively adapt the
Tonelli-Shanks algorithm (for worst-case finite fields [1]) using the same quan-
tum squaring circuits; however, our total operations still include the classical
cost to find the square root.
If we do not need to clear any inputs, we can save one square, and replace
the extended Euclidean algorithm with the modular inversion of Section 2.2.
Arbitrary roots This technique extends to find a1/k, given an input of |a〉,
where k is coprime to the group order. The only change is we must produce
the state
∣∣rka〉 before measuring. This requires O(log k) modular multiplica-
tions, which can be done with limited space using measurement-based pebbling
techniques. The total quantum cost would be O(n2 log k) gates.
2.4 Sparse Matrix Inversion
Given a vector x represented as a bitstring in quantum state, we want to com-
pute A−1x for a classical, invertible sparse matrix A.
For a mask, we use a superposition of vectors r. We compute the following:
|a〉
∑
r
|r〉 |Ar + a〉 (10)
If we are in a finite field, we can take r as a superposition over all possible vectors.
In other contexts, like vectors in Rn or Zn, our mask can be in a superposition
of components that are significantly larger than the largest possible value for a.
This ensures that when we measure t = Ar + a, then there is some value of r
such that r = A−1(t− a) for all a.
We compute A−1t = r + A−1a, and subtract the result from |r〉 and then
negate it. This gives us
|a〉
∣∣A−1a〉 . (11)
We can then uncompute a by multiplying by A.
Cost If A is an N ×M matrix that is k sparse, this costs O(Nk) quantum
multiplications to compute Ar and uncompute a, which are the most expensive
steps.
Since A is known classically, we could compute A−1 directly and multiply
this by x. However, a sparse matrix need not have a sparse inverse, so this could
cost O(NM) multiplications instead. Thus, the technique saves O(N(M − k))
quantum multiplications.
We caution that this technique applies only to vectors represented as bit-
strings, and is thus unrelated and inapplicable to quantum linear algebra tech-
niques based on superpositions such as [13].
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2.5 Group Homomorphisms
As one possible generalization, let G be a group for which there are quantum
circuits to produce a uniform superposition of elements in G, and to perform
the group law. Let f be a homomorphic, invertible function on G for which
we also have a quantum circuit. We start with a state |a〉 and we want to find
f−1(a). We will describe a procedure to produce (f−1(a))−1.
Starting with state |a〉, the masks are a uniform superposition of elements
of G:
|a〉 1√|G|
∑
r∈G
|r〉 (12)
We then compute f(r) in another register, then multiply this by a:
1√
|G| |a〉
∑
r∈G
|r〉 |f(r)〉 |af(r)〉 . (13)
Then we can uncompute f(r) and measure af(r). Let x = f−1(a). Since f is
homomorphic, we have af(r) = f(xr). Since we know this value, we classically
invert f to find xr. If we denote t = xr, we can rewrite our quantum state as
|a〉
∣∣x−1t〉 (14)
Then we use the group operation with t−1 and then t, as in the previous exam-
ples, to get |a〉
∣∣x−1〉.
The total cost is one evaluation of the function f , one quantum-quantum
group operation, two classical-quantum group operations, and the classical cost
to invert f .
In the modular inversion case, f was the identity; the inverse is a side-effect
of the general technique. For square roots, f(x) = x2, and for general roots
f(x) = xn. Matrix inversion uses f(x) = Ax, where the additive inverse is easy
to compute.
This generalization shows that our technique could help with homomorphic
functions on real numbers, such as roots, logarithms, and even inverse trigono-
metric functions.
For example, to compute x from y = sin(x), we can compute cos(x) =√
1− y2, create a mask r then compute and measure
sin(x) cos(r) + cos(x) sin(r) = sin(x+ r). (15)
We can then invert this classically to get x+ r.
2.6 In-place Division
Given a register of states |a〉 of n bits, and a classical argument b, our goal is to
produce |⌊a/b⌋〉 |a mod b〉.
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The mask is a superposition of r1 and r2, where r1 ranges from 0 to 2
m − 1
and r2 ranges from 0 to b − 1. We will parameterize m at the end. Define
r := r1b+ r2; we add r to a to get
|a+ r〉 |r1〉 |r2〉 (16)
and then we measure a+ r.
We can represent a uniquely as a = a1b + a2, where a1 = ⌊a/b⌋ and a2 = a
mod b. Similarly, a+ r = c1b+ c2. We have the following facts:
c1 = a1 + r1 ⇔ a2 + r2 < b (17)
c1 = a1 + r1 + 1⇔ a2 + r2 ≥ b (18)
We also know that c2 ≡ a2 + r2 mod b. and so c2 − r2 = a2 if and only if
c2 − r2 ≥ 0; otherwise, c2 − r2 + b = a2. These are the same conditions as 17
and 18.
Since we can compute c1 and c2 classically, we compute c2−r2 in the register
for r2 and c2 − r1 in the register for r1. We check if c2 − r2 is negative; if it is,
we add b to that register and add 1 to cr − r1. This gives us |a1〉 |a2〉. To clear
the comparison qubit, we check if c2 − a2 is negative.
This carries some probability of failure, since a basic N -bit modular adder
will add modulo 2N . We need a+ r ≤ 2N , which means that if we measure c =
a+r, then for every value of a ≤ c in the superposition, there is precisely 1 value
of r such that this holds. If a > c, there are 0 such values of r. Thus, as long as
our measured result is not smaller than the largest value of a in superposition,
we do not change the state at all. Since a < 2n and r is approximately uniformly
random among m+ ⌊lg b⌋-bit integers, the probability of failure is 2n−m−⌊lg b⌋.
Cost The cost here is dominated by the multiplication r1 × b, which we add
directly into the register with a. We need m additions of a classical integer into
an N := m + ⌊lg b⌋-bit register, and since b is classical these additions can be
windowed [10]. This means the total cost is O(mN/ lgN).
Rines and Chuang [19] provide a circuit for the same task that requires
2(n − ⌊lg b⌋) additions, where n is the length of the initial quantum register.
The additions range from n bits to ⌊lg b⌋ bits, for a total cost of O(n2). Since we
only need to take m as a constant multiple of n for for exponentially suppressed
error, our technique is asymptotically cheaper.
3 Discussion
Applicable functions: For any function that we use with this technique, we
must have a classical method to compute it. With generic transformations, we
could transform this into a quantum circuit with only a constant overhead in
gates. Thus this technique is only applicable in a specific context, where we have
non-asymptotic cost goals. The constant factor difference between classical and
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quantum computation puts us in a strange place, where asymptotics do not
reflect the best implementations.
In all of our applications, to compute a function f on the input we needed
to apply f−1 to the mask. Hence, our technique only helps with functions that
are at least partially one-way, and the improvement is greater for functions that
have a large gap in efficiency between f and f−1. However, every strongly one-
way function that we can think of is either insufficiently homomorphic (e.g.,
cryptographic hash functions) or the inverse function is much easier for the
quantum computer to compute (e.g., group exponentiation).
Uncomputation: The greatest problem with this technique is that by intro-
ducing measurements, we have moved out of a pure quantum circuit model, so
we cannot invert this process. This means that typical techniques like Bennett’s
reduction do not apply. In particular, the technique is inherently out-of-place.
For modular inversion, most applications call for a circuit to compute
|a〉 7→
∣∣a−1〉 (19)
but our method computes
|a〉 7→ |a〉 ∣∣a−1〉 . (20)
With a quantum circuit, we would apply the inverse circuit with the roles of
a and a−1 switched, which would uncompute a. With our method, there is no
inverse circuit. The only way to uncompute a from a−1 is to use an expensive
quantum circuit like the extended Euclidean algorithm, but this defeats the
cost savings of the masking technique. For this reason, we are unable to use our
technique to provide any improvement to elliptic curve point addition, which
requires uncomputing modular inverses.
Complexity Jozsa conjectured that interleaving polylogarithmic-depth quan-
tum computation with a polynomial-size classical computation can simulate any
polynomial-time quantum computation [17]. While recent work provided an or-
acle separation between these classes [5, 6], superposition masking provides a
specific tool that may be able to simulate higher-depth quantum algorithms
with a high-depth classical oracle.
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